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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:  CONSENSUS BUILDING,
PUBLIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Lawrence E. Susskind*
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
It’s a great pleasure to be invited.  I want to talk about democ-
racy.  I also want to talk about public dispute resolution, social jus-
tice, and how these three topics fit together.
Imagine the following scenario:  a small city, wherever you like;
a proposed industrial development project of whatever kind is pro-
posed.  The city council and a number of other boards and permit-
ting agencies in the city must say yes if this is to go forward.  It
involves something bigger than what the general regulatory system
is set up to handle.  Thus, it will require a special permit.  Indeed, a
number of different boards and departments will have to give
approvals.
There is no question that this project is desirable from the stand-
point of producing jobs and sorely needed tax revenue.  It’s pretty
clear that the environmental and public-health risks associated
with this project are substantial enough to cause concern, espe-
cially if impacts are not appropriately mitigated and design options
that would reduce those impacts are not pursued.  So how will the
decision about whether and in what form to permit this project get
made?  What is the normal democratic decision-making process in
such situations in the U.S.?
The city council, which has to give at least a primary permit, taps
one or more agencies to undertake studies of what is being pro-
posed.  The city council might hold hearings, supplementing those
required under the zoning law with additional public meetings.
There would probably be a lot of lobbying behind the scenes by
people for and against the project, speaking through and to mem-
* Lawrence E. Susskind is Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  He is co-director of the Program on
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bers of the city council as well as various agencies.  There would
undoubtedly be a lot of letters written to the newspapers protesting
and supporting the project.  There would probably be a lot of direct
public appeals—in other words, the proponents would take ads in
the paper, contribute op-eds, contribute editorials on the local TV
channel, while the groups opposed would mobilize, in whatever
ways they can, to sway public opinion against the project because
of their worries about the environmental risks as well as their con-
cern that the gains will all go to a small number of out-of-city gain-
ers, and not to local people who ought to be benefiting from the
project.
At some point, the city council will vote.  The majority will rule.
Then there’s likely to be litigation.  It is highly unlikely that the
vote in favor, granting the permits, will be definitive.  Rather, we
would expect somebody to say, “I want another bite at the apple.  I
don’t like that decision.”  It doesn’t matter which side; it could
even be both sides.  So they will litigate, because the primary venue
for democratic decision-making in these kinds of cases is the court.
Other opportunities are insufficient to convince those adversely af-
fected that their interests have been adequately addressed.  Then,
whether the litigation succeeds or not, we’ll look to the next elec-
tion to change the membership of the council so that those who
were unhappy can try again to make sure the outcome is different
the next time a project like this is proposed.
I call this the conventional procedure for making decisions of
these kinds in our democratic society. It offers a measure of ac-
countability through the electoral process.  It incorporates techni-
cal and expert input via the staff of public agencies.  It builds on
freedom of speech, so people can have a say.  How and whether
that say gets taken into account by our elected and appointed offi-
cials, however, is not clear. Nor is it clear what democracy requires
in that regard.
Now consider this alternative.  A project is proposed, concep-
tually, at a very early stage, to the council.  The council says to the
proponents, “Terrific.  We want to set in motion a process to see if
consensus can be reached on whether a project like that in the
place you have in mind ought to go forward.  If so, what stream of
benefits and costs—gains and losses—are likely to be associated
with it in the minds of those who see themselves as stakeholders?
And, what can be done to adjust the benefits and costs flowing
from the project to ensure that everyone is treated fairly and there
is sufficient attention to sustainability?”
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So the council, at that moment, hires a mediator (i.e., a profes-
sional neutral) and says, “We need to determine who should be at
the table to participate in a collaborative design process, to ensure
that we come as close as possible to an informed consensus on
whether, and if so, how, this project should go forward.”  The neu-
tral undertakes something we call a conflict assessment.  “Conflict
assessment” is both a noun and a verb.  As a verb, the conflict as-
sessor, the neutral, interviews, privately and confidentially, three
circles of potential stakeholders.
The first is an obvious set of people who have already made their
views known.  It’s clear that certain groups will want to be in-
volved—abutters to the proposed site, various city departments
and agencies, maybe regional agencies, maybe state or federal de-
partments and agencies. The assessor meets with them and says,
“Listen, confidentially and off the record, what are your concerns
about this project?  What issues do you think ought to be ad-
dressed in a collaborative process to see whether, and if so, how,
this project should proceed?  I’m not going to quote you, but I
need some sense of what you think the conversation should cover
and who should be at the table.  I can’t do that without hearing
from you.  I need to map the potential conflict.”  Within that round
of interviews with the obvious first circle of potential stakeholders,
one of the questions the neutral asks is, “Who else do you think
needs to be at the table?  Who else do you think I ought to be
talking to?”
That first set of conversations leads to a much larger second cir-
cle of conversations.  These are conducted in the same way:  “Con-
fidentially, off the record, I want to talk to you.  I have been hired
by the Council to explore the question of whether there ought to
be a collaborative process, and if so, who should be at the table and
how the conversation should be structured.”  The Council an-
nounces publicly that this consultative process is under way and
says, “Anybody who thinks they should be involved, contact the
neutral.”  The neutral’s name, email address, phone number, and
local drop-in spot are described in a newspaper story about the
process.  This identifies the third circle of stakeholders.  The first
circle of people interviewed are the obvious players identified by
those in authority; the second circle is suggested by the first circle;
those in the third circle nominate themselves when they hear that
there is a process of conversation underway.
That’s a lot of interviews.  We do such interviews and prepare a
one-page matrix, a map of the conflict, with categories of groups
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down the side and issues across the top.  In each cell, we indicate
what that category of stakeholders thinks about that issue.  How
important is it to them?  What do they most want to have happen
and least want to have happen?  What else do they think they need
to know?  We fill in the matrix.  Nobody’s name needs to be
mentioned.
Then, the neutral takes the matrix and sends it to everybody who
was interviewed, in draft, and says, “Do you see what you told me
in here?  If not, help me fix the matrix.”  Nobody is named directly,
but if I talked to you, you ought to find what you said in my sum-
mary.  The neutral gets that feedback, finalizes the matrix, and
then writes, in a ten-to-twelve-page document, suggestions for how
and whether to proceed with a collaborative design process.  The
neutral also offers another dozen pages that say, “These are the
stakeholder categories that need to be represented if you really
want to address this issue successfully.  Here are the kinds of play-
ers in each category who need to be brought together, to caucus, to
choose a representative to represent them.  Here’s what the agenda
should include.  It’s these issues across the top.  Here is the work
plan.”
To take up this set of issues and address the concerns of these
groups, the neutral offers a work plan, a budget, and a timetable.
The neutral can also say something about the kind of mediation
team needed to assist, if the process goes forward. That document
should be sent to everyone interviewed with a note that says: “If
this is the game, would you play?  Would you at least come to the
first meeting?  If you have a problem with what I am suggesting,
please tell me.  I won’t quote you.  I just want to hear whether my
proposal makes sense to you.”
The neutral gets the feedback, adjusts the document, and then
gives it to the convening body that hired him in the first place.  The
first paragraph has to say, yes or no, do you think a consensus-
oriented process can bring the right parties to the table and pro-
duce an agreement on whether, and if so, how, the project should
go forward?   The document also lists in the back all the groups
that need to caucus in different kinds of ways to allow self-selection
of representative spokespeople for each category of stakeholders.
The neutral sends that document to everyone interviewed and
asks, “This is what I am proposing to the convening body.  Do you
have a problem with that? Tell me.” The final version of this docu-
ment goes to the elected body.  It indicates either yes or no—
should the city proceed with a collaborative design process.  If no
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the city will proceed with its traditional process.  If yes, the parties
have jointly designed the procedure for going forward.
If you say, “We’ll do whatever you guys say,” then someone is
going to complain, “What did we elect you for?  Who is going to
guarantee that the public interest is served?  Just because some
people happened to have been talked to and you produced a docu-
ment, that doesn’t mean you can abdicate your responsibility to
exercise judgment on behalf of the public-at-large.”  So there has
to be a mission statement that explains that, if the process goes
forward, what the status will be of the prescription that comes out
at the end of that process, vis-a`-vis decision-making by the author-
ity.  You can’t delegate away, if you are that body, your responsi-
bility for making final decisions.  You have to say something about
what your predisposition is towards agreement, especially if it’s
reached by consensus.
Once the assessment is done, the stakeholder representatives
must be selected.  Assume the officials involved appoint a forty-
plus member collaborative group.  The process should be facili-
tated by a team of neutrals.  It may take eight-to-twelve months.
The result is likely to be a different plan from what would have
emerged if the developer—the proponent of the project—had pro-
duced his own plan.  The collaborative plan should include deals
between all kinds of dyads and triads about how some of the value
that will be created will or won’t, on contingent terms, be given for
this, given for that, given to this one, or exchanged in this way.
In that deal, for the lawyers in the room, all kinds of commit-
ments are likely to be made that go beyond what the city govern-
ment has the authority to require.  Such agreements are voluntary.
That is, they are negotiated. The parties can’t be asked to do some-
thing beyond what is statutorily required, but they can volunteer to
do so.  If they volunteer, all kinds of modifications can be added as
orders of condition to any permit, even if what is included tran-
scends the statutory authority of the regulatory body.  If that isn’t
good enough (from an implementation standpoint), a private con-
tract can be fashioned among the different sets of parties.  From all
of this, a near-consensual deal can emerge, along with a schedule of
commitments.
Ultimately, the draft agreement comes as a proposal to the coun-
cil.  The council still needs to hold a hearing on it.  If all goes well,
nobody should show up at these hearing.  In fact, the only people
who usually come are those who participated in the collaborative
process, to say what a wonderful process it was.  The participants
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will look to see if anybody who refused to participate initially has
the gall to stand up and say that something is wrong with what the
group produced.  The city council has to hear what everyone has to
say, regardless of the success of the collaborative process.  Maybe
somebody will show up and say, “I never heard about this.  I didn’t
know anything was being discussed.  This deal just tramples on my
rights,” in which case the council may have to give the negotiating
group a mandate to go back and make adjustments in its proposal.
Finally, the council must vote.
Behind the scenes, some of the well-heeled participants may be
looking for “a second bite at the apple,” so to speak.  They may
take some members of the council out for dinner and suggest that
their next political campaign might go a lot more smoothly if they
make additional demands on some of the people involved in the
collaborative process.  In all likelihood, the council isn’t going to
do that.  If they do, they are probably not going to get elected
again. Certainly, it will be terribly difficult to get residents to par-
ticipate in similar collaborative processes in the future.
There are all kinds of questions about what the court’s reaction
ought to be to people who were invited to participate, maybe even
did participate and signed a consensus agreement, but want more.
Should the court grant them standing to raise anything other than a
constitutional question, as opposed to an interest-based or proce-
dural question, that asks the court to reconsider the substance of
the agreement?  Some of you know a lot more about such legal
matters than I do.  All I can tell you is that I have facilitated many
such processes. We have generated a lot of agreements, and,
mostly, they have not been litigated.
So, I’ve described two scenarios:  one, the traditional model; and,
the second, a consensus-oriented model.
My question to you—and it’s not an easy question—is which is
more democratic?  Which is more consistent with the ideals of de-
mocracy, as we mean to guarantee them in the United States, pur-
suant to our Constitution and our traditions?  The first one values
representative democracy.  It says that a general-purpose elected
official should make public policy decisions; that we need free and
fair elections, accountability through transparency, and the right of
individuals to petition the government and to speak freely.  What is
it, then, about the first scenario, that is not completely consistent
with our democratic ideals?  I would argue, nothing.  It’s com-
pletely consistent with our prevailing notions of democracy.  How
democratic is the second?  It has everything the first one has, and
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more.  Does that make it more democratic?  It depends on what
you think democracy is supposed to achieve.
I am going to talk about three problems with the first model that
lead me to advocate the second.  What I am really doing is telling
you about three problems I see inherent in our current approach to
doing democracy.  We are not forbidden, please note, from enhanc-
ing or deepening our commitment to democracy and our demo-
cratic ideals.  Thus, I am going to suggest that a commitment to
consensus building in public decision-making, embodied by the sec-
ond model, would in fact, deepen our embrace of democratic
principles.
The first problem is the majority-rule problem.  The second
problem, in my view, is the representation problem.  The third
problem is what I call the adversarial-format problem.  These are,
in my mind, three big weaknesses of traditional democratic deci-
sion-making.  My argument is that all three can be remedied by a
resort to the second model, by a commitment to supplement repre-
sentative democracy with more ad hoc approaches to consensus
building.  I am going to take each of these three problems in turn
and suggest why and how I think we can move, as a society, to the
second model—not just at the city scale, but at the county, re-
gional, state, and national scales as well. (I even think we can apply
consensus building models at the international scale, but that’s for
another day.)
THE MAJORITY-RULE PROBLEM
The majority-rule problem inherent in the first model was
presented in my first scenario:  We only seek 51% support for deci-
sions, as if somehow that’s good enough.  The other 49% are sup-
posed to happily lump it.  That’s what a commitment to majority
rule implies. We operate on a majority rule basis in almost every
administrative and legislative context in America.  Presumably, we
have decided that a bare majority is the best we can do.  I don’t get
that.  Shouldn’t we at least try to achieve near-unanimity before
assuming that the best we can achieve is 51% agreement?
My primary point is that we are not going to do “better” than
51% unless we try.  It rarely happens by accident in a controversial
decision-making situation that more than a bare majority gets its
way.  Unless you organize a decision process to achieve near-una-
nimity—that is, structure the ground rules and the management of
the conversation properly—it won’t happen.
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I imagine that what is going through your minds is that consen-
sus building takes too long, costs too much, and won’t be definitive.
We have to make decisions.  We have to make so many decisions in
a democratic society that seeking anything more than 51%, espe-
cially seeking near-unanimity on a great many public policy deci-
sion—will take forever.  Secondly, if it takes longer, it will cost
more.  Thirdly, if it takes longer and costs more, while that might
be worth it, there is no guarantee that we will reach a final decision
in time if we commit to near-unanimity as our decision rule.  With
a 51% decision rule, once you have it, you are done.
How many examples would I have to give you of large, complex,
multi-stakeholder dialogues, organized in the way that I have de-
scribed in my second scenario, that produced near-unanimity, fore-
stalled litigation, produced higher levels of satisfaction with the
outcome in the hearts and minds of the participants and those af-
fected by the decisions who weren’t participants, before you would
say that maybe it is possible to shoot for something more than
51%?  100?  1000? 10,000?
I have spent my professional life working in these kinds of situa-
tions and training people to manage consensus building efforts.
We now have more than enough examples of successful consensus
building efforts in highly controversial situations—plenty of people
in this room do this work and can attest to what I am saying—to be
able to conclude that it doesn’t take forever; doesn’t cost too much;
and can be definitive within a pre-set timeframe.
If you tell me we have nine months to get agreement and either
we succeed in building consensus or we go back to the traditional
model, then that’s what we have to do.  The participants either
agree to produce a consensus in that time frame, and work to get a
better result than what the traditional model will get them, or they
don’t proceed.  We know we can get near-unanimity if the process
is managed with that as the goal.  We know we can get parties to
come to the table when what we are offering them is an opportu-
nity to get something better than what the traditional process is
likely to produce.  The only trick is that the participants have to
believe that the elected body is going to accept the proposal gener-
ated by the group, as long as it meets certain tests of transparency,
accountability, and fairness.
It works with a system of ad hoc representation, because all cate-
gories of stakeholders are explicitly represented by ad hoc spokes-
people they have chosen for the specific discussion.  It works
because the process of conversation is not about arguing, it is about
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problem-solving.  It’s not about discrediting the other side; it’s
about combining everybody’s brain power, effort, and energy to
come up with something better for everyone than what the tradi-
tional method is likely to yield.
THE REPRESENTATION PROBLEM
We should try to supplement representative democracy with “ad-
hocracy.”  The product of “ad-hocracy” will still have to be judged
and evaluated by the representative democratic system.  In the sec-
ond model, representatives are chosen by each stakeholder group
specifically for a particular policy discussion—that’s why I say ad
hoc.  These are not general-purpose, longstanding elected repre-
sentatives.  They are not expected to represent a large, diverse con-
stituency.  Rather, they are chosen to represent a group that knows
its interests and shares a point of view on a particular question.
We tend to think, in our democratic system, that general-purpose
elected representatives are good enough for everything.  We like
having elections.  We think that free and fair elections will some-
how solve the problem of having a representative who has the sup-
port of 51% of the people in a district while 49% of the people in
that same district voted against them.  How (and why) are they
supposed to serve the people that voted against them?
Why don’t we have a system of representation that ensures that
the people representing folks really are accountable to that constit-
uency? If you didn’t vote for me, why should I do anything for
you?  How are you going to hold me accountable if I don’t do what
you want?  You were in the 49% that voted against me—too bad
for you.  Why not have representation that reflects the intensity of
concerns of each constituency vis-a`-vis a specific issue? The only
way to do this is with ad hoc (i.e. temporary) representatives rather
than general purpose elected officials.
Each person has many identities.  If you ask me how I think
about myself, I may choose to describe my interests in terms of a
political party, as a resident of a geographic area, as an environ-
mentalist, along the lines of my religious convictions, or some other
way.   But if you ask me to describe my views on a specific project
in my neighborhood, suddenly I think of myself as an abutter or a
landowner, in addition to all my other identities.  How do I want to
be represented with regard to a particular decision?  Give me a
choice.  Talk to me and find out how I want to identify my stake-
holder interests for the purposes of a specific decision and then
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allow me to participate in the process of choosing an ad hoc repre-
sentative for that purpose.
If you have hard-to-represent constituencies, you can use proxies
to represent them.  Think in terms of a guardian ad litem chosen by
the court to represents the interests of a child.  Or, think about how
we choose the member(s) of a class to represent everyone with a
stake in a class-action law suit.  Once we have a sense of the cate-
gories of stakeholders, we can figure out a way to represent hard-
to-represent or diffuse interests.  We can even represent genera-
tions as yet unborn.  We can select people who are willing to take
on such roles for the purpose of a public policy discussion.
THE ADVERSARIAL FORMAT PROBLEM
Linked to these first two problems is what I call the adversarial
format problem.  I am not just talking about litigation. Go to a
public hearing.  What is your job as a spokesperson?  Your job is to
advance the interests of your group.  How do you do that?  If I
assume that the only way my interests can be advanced is if some-
body else’s are compromised, then I will act accordingly.  I will try
to discredit the claims of others.  I will trash whatever evidence or
arguments they put forward.  That’s what I have to do if I assume
that the only way my interests can be advanced is if other people’s
interests are short-changed.  So, if you assume that you are in a
win/lose contest, you will act accordingly to advance your own
interests.
But what if we said, for the occasion of a particular public deci-
sion-making situation, that we want to seek an outcome that gets
everybody more than what they can otherwise count on if there
were no agreement through a collaborative process.  (Everyone
would have to do a hardheaded analysis of what their most realistic
option would be if there was no consensus agreement.  In negotia-
tion language, we call that estimating your “BATNA,” your best
alternative to the negotiated agreement.)1
I am not arguing that collaborative processes or consensus build-
ing efforts get everybody everything they want.  I’m not talking
about win/win. It is not possible for everyone to get everything
they want.  The question to ask is whether a consensus outcome
offers everybody something better than what they have a right to
expect from the traditional process of decision-making, the first
1. See generally ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Penguin
1981).
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model?  Usually, you can’t know your BATNA, but you can esti-
mate it. You just have to know how to multiply the probability of
getting what you want times the value of what you want. That’s
called your “expected value.”
Assume there’s a 50% chance under the traditional model of
getting two-thirds of what you want.  Point five (.5) times two-
thirds yields your expected value.  This is what you do in a litiga-
tion context when you try to estimate the likely value of going to
court.  You need something to compare possible settlement agree-
ments against.  Is a proposed settlement any good?  Well, as com-
pared to what?  As compared to what you want?  No.  As
compared to what you are likely to get if the court case proceeds.
The same thing is true in the public arena.  “If you work in this
way, together with these other people, there’s a chance you’ll get a
better outcome than what you’ll probably get if you go the tradi-
tional route.”  In a collaborative process we ask the parties to com-
mit to finding ways of creating value so that everybody can get
more than they would from a traditional process.  That requires
exploiting the cooperative interests that the parties have, not just
allowing their competitive interests to swamp the dialogue.
In negotiation theory, we talk about mixed motives.  Everybody
entering a negotiation has both a cooperative interest in creating as
much value as possible—because that might yield a bigger share
for them—as well as a competitive desire to get the biggest share
for themselves that they can.
How can I cooperate with someone I know I’m competing with?
It’s hard, especially when you have to create enough trust for the
cooperative part of your mixed motive interaction to work.  That’s
often why the parties need a professional neutral to manage the
dialogue, someone who is not partisan.  It is too easy to sink into
purely competitive behavior.  Especially when there are many par-
ties negotiating many issues it often takes some guidance to create
value through what we call integrative bargaining—a process of lis-
tening, understanding, exploring possible trades, expanding the
agenda, redefining terms, and considering options that would oth-
erwise not be possible.
CONSENSUS BUILDING
I am arguing that the majority-rule problem, the representation
problem, and the adversarial-format problem cause us, in a public
disputes context, to produce, while still democratic, outcomes that
are less just in the eyes of the parties than they need to be.  I am
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arguing that a switch to a consensus-oriented approach will be as, if
not more, democratic.  It will be as efficient—if you look at the
entire time it takes to get something implemented—because par-
ticipants in collaborative processes are more likely to do what they
promise.
For people who have somehow gotten in their mind the idea that
consensus building is bad for the least powerful, let me try to con-
vince you otherwise.  One assumption is that the least powerful
parties won’t know how to represent their interests or their inter-
ests will be ignored by the more powerful or articulate groups at
the table.  But, it is the role of the neutral to ensure a fair, efficient,
and wise process. We talk about the responsibilities and profes-
sional obligations of a neutral (mediator) in the public arena. The
neutral has an ethical obligation to ensure a process that is fair,
efficient, stable, and wise, as well as an outcome that is fair, effi-
cient, stable, and wise in the eyes of the parties.  In my view, unless
we require public policymakers, as a rule, to embrace consensus
building, we will always get less just outcomes.
That’s not how dispute resolution has been sold.  Dispute resolu-
tion to date has been sold on efficiency grounds—save time, save
money; choose ADR.  But I am arguing, in the public arena, that a
commitment to consensus building can produce fairer, wiser, more
efficient, and more stable results.
Minimum procedural rights still have to be guaranteed.  That’s
why consensus building is a supplement to and not a replacement
for traditional decision-making.  We cannot ask elected and ap-
pointed officials to delegate away their statutorily defined respon-
sibility to ad hoc assemblies of various kinds.  But that is why I
advocate the elaborate conflict assessment procedures I described
earlier.  It is also why elected and appointed officials must convene
collaborative processes to ensure their legitimacy.  In addition, the
convenors must provide a clear mission statement for the partici-
pants before they begin.  Usually, it says something like:  “If this
process can be shown to produce an informed, nearly unanimous
outcome, we are inclined to support what you come up with.”
It doesn’t forestall litigation.  If somebody challenges what
comes out, for whatever reason, (especially if they think that some-
one’s fundamental rights have been abridged), then a consensus
outcome can and should be challenged.
So, consensus building is not an alternative to representative de-
mocracy.  It is a supplement to it when it is done in the way I have
described.  Unfortunately, too many people have said, “You can
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either choose the traditional approach or you can choose consensus
building.”  That is a gross error, and it has hurt the ADR move-
ment.  It is especially difficult for those of us who try to advocate
the second approach, when we have to talk to elected and ap-
pointed officials who say:
“Oh, you want to put me out of business.”
“I don’t want to put you out of business,” we reply.
“You want to abridge my authority.  I stood for election.  What
gives you the right to stand in my way?”
“I’m trying to give you a chance to find out what action you can
take that will cause everybody to stand up and cheer and make
them all want to vote for you.  Don’t you want to know what that
would be?  Because, that is the product of consensus building.  The
product is the thing you could do that everyone would applaud and
say, ‘My goodness, you’re a smart elected official.  My goodness,
you have taken my interests to heart.’”
That is not taking anyone’s authority away.  But, unfortunately,
too many people, in their enthusiasm to support the concept of
public dispute resolution, have sold it or tried to sell it as an alter-
native to traditional decision-making.
For consensus building in the public arena to work, we probably
need to institutionalize a set of ground rules—that is, to say what
the qualities are of good processes—to make sure there is a supply
of capable, qualified, professional neutrals, who subscribe to a
clear code with regard to their unique responsibilities working in
the public policy realm.
Why wouldn’t public officials prefer to know a way to proceed
that would be viewed as meeting everybody’s interests?  If we can
show that an informed consensus can be produced in a reasonable
amount of time, at a reasonable cost, in a way that doesn’t leave
anybody out, in a way that deals with inequalities across groups, in
a way that ensures that hard-to-represent interests are presented,
why wouldn’t that be preferable?
I will stop at this point.  We have a little time for questions.
Thanks very much.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
QUESTIONER:  I have a technical question.  I used to work for
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  I was in charge of
the Hoboken waterfront development for twenty-five years, so I
have a degree of background in dealing with the processes you talk
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about.  But I don’t think we did it as well as we could have if I had
been here first.
At any rate, the technical question is on the confidentiality issue.
When you go back and forth, I assume you are only asking that one
group whether you are reflecting correctly what they want.  You
are not sending the whole matrix out to everybody.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  I am.  I am sending the whole matrix to
everyone.  Nobody’s name is mentioned in it.  I say, “Do you see
what you told me adequately represented in here?”
QUESTIONER:  But everyone knows who the representatives
of the groups are.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  How?  I interviewed hundreds of people.
QUESTIONER:  But you have it—explain it to me.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  I indicate categories of stakeholders down
the side, no names of people.  It could be abutters.  It could be
agencies with waterfront responsibility.  They don’t know who I
talked to.  I am not citing anybody by name.
QUESTIONER:  So the confidentiality is to a particular person.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  Correct.
QUESTIONER:  But it is important to have an understanding of
what the group is likely to want or not want.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  Correct.
QUESTIONER:  Okay.  I was interested in the issue of city
council decision-making.  One of the issues we always confronted
was that the city council would often say, “I can’t predict what I’m
going to agree to.”  How do you deal with that?
PROF. SUSSKIND:  I say, “Could you tell me ahead of time the
qualities of an agreement that you are inclined to support?”
“If it is more nearly unanimous, would that make a difference to
you?”
“If it reflects the full, direct involvement of all the parties, as
opposed to some being left out, wouldn’t you prefer that?”
“If it’s done within an agreed-upon timeframe, wouldn’t that be
better?”
“If it’s done in a way that is transparent so that during the pro-
cess, summaries of what is going on are on a Web page that any-
body can look at, wouldn’t you prefer that?”
“What if the meetings are broadcast on an access channel, of the
group actually having all of its conversations, so anybody can
watch?”
“Wouldn’t you prefer an agreement produced by a process like
this?  Wouldn’t you prefer an agreement that has these attributes?”
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I am talking about the qualities of an agreement.  Then, when I
come to the end of my list, I say, “This is an agreement that met all
the qualities of process design, process management, and outcome
that you articulated in terms of what would make you predisposed
to support it.  If you don’t support it now, you are going to need to
explain to all these people why.  It’s still your choice.”
QUESTIONER:  Okay.  We found that one of the problems was
that the length of time to get decisions extended beyond terms of
office, extended beyond the leadership role of the various stake-
holder groups, particularly on a large-scale project.  How do you
overcome that?
PROF. SUSSKIND:  There are two parts to that problem.  First,
a lot of processes take longer because they don’t have a timeframe
that people have committed to in the beginning.  The presumption
was, “Who knows how long it’s going to take to get agreement?  I
have argued that the joint design of the collaborative process
through a conflict assessment procedure needs to produce a timeta-
ble.  The deadlines are binding unless the whole group unani-
mously agrees to extend the deadlines for an explicit period of
time.
If I say to people, “We have six months.  We are going to either
have a process that gets consensus in six months or we’re not.  Do
you want to participate?”  They can usually answer yes or no.
I would argue that most things called “collaborative processes,”
most things called “consensus building” sponsored by public agen-
cies today do not meet the tests I have described.  They do not
have ad hoc representation that is the product of a conflict assess-
ment. They are not managed by independent professional neutrals
that the group has chosen.  They do not have explicit ground rules,
a timetable, a budget, and a work plan that the group itself was
part of producing.  That’s why they take so long and often fail to
generate agreement.
Second, we do invite every organization or collective of organi-
zations in a stakeholder category to not only have one representa-
tive, but also to have an alternate. If there is a change in the
membership of a group or somebody’s situation changes, the group
has continuity in its representation.  We often have one representa-
tive at the table and one sitting right behind them.  We have, in a
sense, multiple representatives of categories of stakeholders.
I don’t want to pick on any particular federal agency, but I am
working with the Interior Department which claims that it sub-
scribes to consensus building and is committed to a whole lot of
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processes.
I asked, “Do the parties choose their own representatives?”
“Oh, my God, no.  The crazies would be at the table then.”
“Do the parties help define what they are going to work on?”
“My God, no.  They’re not expert enough to know what the
agenda should be.”
“Is the process facilitated by a neutral that the parties selected?”
“No, no, no.  We have people on staff who run the meetings.”
“Do they have a budget that they can use for joint fact finding?”
“No.  Any facts they need, we have already done the work for
them.”
“Have they produced a written agreement that the parties went
back to their constituencies to get support for before they signed?”
“No.  We don’t want to be bound by a written agreement.”
“But, boy, are we committed to collaborative consensus
building.”
That’s my experience across the country.
QUESTIONER:  I think the problem is that leaders and deci-
sion makers think that it will be quicker and easier not to have to
deal with all of the, quote, crazies.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  They think that, but look how long it takes
them, when you count from the time they start to the time they
tentatively finish, to the time the litigation takes, to the time that
the next administration comes in and takes over and redefines the
problem.
QUESTIONER:  I’m sure this comes up whenever you give this
presentation.  How do you deal with a stakeholder who believes
that the whole proposal is an unmitigated disaster?  Why would
they want to participate at all?
It makes me think of why people, as a group, decide to boycott
elections.  Sometimes it is in their interest to do that.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  My experience has been that most of the
ways in which people are consulted through the traditional mecha-
nisms of public engagement only frame the public policy question
in one way.  They ask, “Should we build this facility, defined this
way, in this place, with the presumed distribution of benefits and
costs that go along with it?”  A group in opposition is thinking,
“Over my dead body,” literally.  “I’m willing to fight to the death
to stop this thing.”
You say to that group, “So there is no version of this facility
anywhere that you would be interested in?”
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They answer, “That’s not the question I was asked.”
“And there is no version of this facility-plus that would be of any
interest to you?”
“What do you mean by plus?”
“Some way of taking some of the gains from the proposed facil-
ity and committing them, in a linked way, to a set of things you
have been trying to get done that you have not had the resources
or support to do.  Let’s talk about a package that includes the facil-
ity, changed, managed in a way you prefer, perhaps in a different
location, plus the use of some of the benefits to accomplish a series
of linked objectives in the community.”
They usually say, “Nobody ever asked me that question before.”
The only way you can have integrative bargaining around an is-
sue is to fractionate it, enrich the agenda, alter the frame of the
conversation, and put on the table different kinds of benefits and
their distribution.
Typically, a public agency will tell me, “We don’t have the au-
thority to talk about those other benefits or linked changes.  That’s
some other agency’s responsibility.”
We say, “You don’t need additional authority.  You won’t be
making a decision until there is a voluntarily agreed upon proposal.
So, let’s pursue this in the way the conflict assessment suggested
that groups would like the agenda formulated.  Then, it will be
‘rich’ enough to make it worth their while to come to the table.”
Once they are at the table, whatever they come out with, if it’s
voluntary and all the relevant agencies and groups have been in-
volved, then you won’t have to impose something you have no au-
thority to impose.
So, this is the way you can offer a set of benefits and reduce costs
to groups who otherwise would say, “No way.  I’m not even coming
to the table.  I don’t want to encourage anyone to even think about
this project.”  You have to reframe what is being talked about.
QUESTIONER:  I think that presents a problem with the role of
the neutral, which you referred to before.  The role of the neutral
isn’t really neutral.  The role of the neutral is, “I want a process
that is going to make things go forward,” when the stakeholders’
interest might be, “Our interest is, kill it, period.  Every single
thing you do that moves the process forward is a disaster for us.”
PROF. SUSSKIND:  No.  That’s their position.  Their position is,
“Kill it.”  Their interests, however, are the reasons why they want
to kill it.
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If you say to me, “I want to kill it because I do not want that
added risk or danger in my community,” I say, “What if, as part of
building this project, I can help you reduce other risks you have
that are even greater than the risk you are worried about?”  That
could be part of the package.  If you are worried about risk, I am
going to make you better off by having this facility.
QUESTIONER:  The example I think of is when they proposed
to build an eight-lane highway from the Battery to 34th Street,
which involved destroying every neighborhood in between.  If you
said, “What if it’s two lanes and we give you some schools,” it’s still
a disaster.  No matter what you do, it’s always a disaster.  So the
only way for a person like Jane Jacobs to address it was, “We’re not
negotiating anything.  We are simply killing it.”
PROF. SUSSKIND:  Trying to kill it.
QUESTIONER:  The collaborative process seems to be, “Hey,
let’s work a deal.”
PROF. SUSSKIND:  The group that says no is hoping to kill it,
to achieve or maintain certain values or interests that it has.  If I
ask that group, “What are the odds of your succeeding,” they’ll say
“Well, it’s an uphill battle.  Perhaps there’s a 20% chance of our
succeeding.”
I say, “What if I could increase the odds of your accomplishing
what you care about?  What if you could get more of what you
want (with certainty) by arguing for the project than by arguing
against it?”
If the answer to that is, “No, you can’t offer me enough.” Then,
you may not get a certain group to come to the table.  The others
may still decide it’s still worth going forward without that group.
That is why I talk about near-unanimity.
I never define consensus as unanimity.  That is an invitation to
blackmail.  The next-to-the-last group can put anything in the
world it wants on the agenda.  To some extent, that’s the United
Nations’ problem.  In my view, no one should adopt unanimity as
their decision rule.  It invites non-productive strategic behavior.  If
I seek unanimity, but I’m prepared to settle for overwhelming
agreement, I eliminate the blackmail problem.
If I have a group that thinks there is no version of a proposal
they can live with—“You want to put this bio-lab here next to me
in the city?  I don’t care how much protection you add.  I don’t
care whether you put it underground.  I don’t care what security
you wrap around it.  It doesn’t belong in the city.  Don’t build bio-
labs near people.”
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You say, “I hear you.  But there is no restriction against bio-labs
in the city.  If the majority of members of the regulatory board feel
that safety has been adequately addressed, it can go ahead.  So,
would you like to talk, on a contingent basis, about what version of
the bio-lab, if it goes forward, you would want, and what guaran-
tees of mitigation and compensation should be part of a package,
or do you want to take a chance that the proponents’ version of the
project (without any input from you) will be permitted?  You can
still campaign to keep it out of the city.  But, if it does go ahead, at
least you will have participated in shaping the best possible version
of the project from your standpoint.
QUESTIONER:  Have you found that one of the problems with
convincing people to use the second approach is that it makes the
actual behind-the-scene powers who control things in danger, in
terms of the transparency and the sunshine aspect?  How do you
deal with that?
PROF. SUSSKIND:  I would argue that the second process is
more transparent.  What people worry most about is some sort of
behind-closed-doors deal making by some ad hoc group that can’t
be held accountable because they are not elected, because they are
not general-purpose officials. That is why, by the way, that public
dispute mediators advocate that almost all meetings be open.
QUESTIONER:  I’m not sure I was clear.  In other words, the
first model, our regular model, perhaps allows a certain obfusca-
tion of people who are actually engaged in controlling that.  The
second model –
PROF. SUSSKIND:  Takes that away.
QUESTIONER:  Yes.
PROF. SUSSKIND:  That’s what I was going to argue.  What I
say to elected and appointed officials is, “Support this process, and
the product will be one you can count on everybody liking. If the
group fails to reach consensus, you can go back and play all the old
games.”
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ107.txt unknown Seq: 20 25-JAN-08 12:43
